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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Moral  objections  to quota  trade  are  common  in  public  discussion.
The underlying  moral  reasoning  is often  hard to extract  from  the
public’s  rhetoric,  and  economists  often  claim  that the  objections
are  due  to  misunderstandings.  In  this  paper  we  test  experimentally
one possible  objection  to  trading  emission  rights:  that  selling
pollution  rights  is objectionable  because  it involves  trade  in  the
right  to do something  wrong.  The  experiment  is  phrased  in a
neutral language  to  avoid  invoking  subjects’  prior  attitudes  to
trading  pollution  permits.  In the  experiment,  subjects  earn  money
from  using  stickers  that  inﬂict  losses  on  others.  After  the  initial
rounds,  the use  of  stickers  is  limited  and  the  rights  to  use  stickers
are tradable.  We  observe  no  reluctance  to  trade these  rights
compared  to a control  treatment  with  identical  incentives  but  no
externalities.  In a ﬁnal  stage,  subjects  vote  on  whether  stickers
should  be  tradable  or not.  Subjects  in  both  treatments  are  almost
unanimous  in the  support  to trade.  A  majority  of  third  party
subjects asked  to  judge  the  experimental  procedures,  however,
indicated  that  the market  made  the  use  of  stickers  seem  more
moral. A  post  experiment  survey  showed  that our subject  pool
had  a negative  attitude  to  real life trade  of  emission  quota.  The
experiment  ﬁnds  no  indication  that  this  attitude  is  due  to  a  concern
over  tradable  quotas  legitimizing  morally  objectionable  actions.
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1. Introduction
When the “environmental revolution” arrived in the 1960s, economists were ready and waiting.
- Opening statement of “The theory of environmental policy” (Baumol and Oates, 1988)
The Times was ﬂooded with scathing letters — mostly from economists, some of them my  Har-
vard colleagues. I failed to understand the virtue of markets, they suggested, or the efﬁciencies
of trade, or the elementary principles of economic rationality.
-Philosopher Michael Sandel on reactions to his moral arguments against tradable emission
quotas (Sandel, 2012)
Economists were quick to suggest environmental taxes and tradable emission quotas when the
modern environmental movement arrived, but, as Baumol and Oates (1988) pointed out, these solu-
tions were not well received.1 Command and control were preferred to economic instruments like
quotas and taxes, and while some schemes involving tradable emission quotas have been imple-
mented recently, legal instruments still dominate. There was, and still is, a considerable resistance
toward both taxes and tradable quotas, often laced with moral indignation. This is especially so for
tradable emission quotas.
Why  do many non-economists object so strongly to an idea that economists typically support? Do
non-economists fail to understand the basic idea behind quota trade, or has economic training some-
how made economists blind to moral issues that others ﬁnd obvious? To examine this, we designed an
experiment where participants could trade the rights to do wrong. The wrong involved using ‘stick-
ers’ that brought gain to the user and harm to the other group members, with net harm overall. We
examined whether participants found trade in the rights to use stickers objectionable both before
and after experience with trade in a double-auction trading market. The design did not invoke a cli-
mate/environmental context, and the use of terms such as “quotas” or “emissions” was  avoided so as
not to trigger prior convictions on the morality of emission trading schemes.
Skepticism toward tradable emission quotas seems to be widespread. Asked in 2010 whether
“Norway ought to take its share of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions by buying emission
quotas from other countries,” a nationally representative survey of the Norwegian population found
46% disagreeing with the statement.2 This negative attitude to tradable emissions quotas is also appar-
ent in ofﬁcial Norwegian policy. Following an intense political debate on the morality of buying quotas
abroad, the ﬁnal policies emphasized targets for domestic abatements at the expense of cost efﬁciency
(Eyckmans and Kverndokk, 2010).
One explanation for this skepticism may  be that politicians and the public fail to understand how
a tradable emission would work and what it would achieve. Alternatively, it may  be economists that
are unable to see a moral argument that non-economists emphasize. Past experimental results have
shown that economics students tend to act more selﬁshly than other students. This may  be due to
selection (Frey and Meier, 2005), but it may  also reﬂect the effects of their training: economists are
typically taught to focus on outcomes, leading to an emphasis on total costs and emissions in our
context. If policy A yields better consequences for everyone than policy B, economists will tend to see
A as the best option, even if this policy “legitimizes” something others feel should be stigmatized.
The view that markets legitimize objectionable actions appears in many contexts. We  have
observed it in talk shows, cartoons, and discussions with non-economists. A typical argument is to
state or suggest that the logic of quota trading would extend to quotas for any number of bad or illegal
activities. The satirical website cheatneutral.com claims to “highlight some of the issues surrounding
carbon offsetting” by providing people who cheat on their spouses the opportunity to pay others to
refrain from doing so – thus offsetting the sin. By “funding someone else to be faithful and NOT cheat
[t]his neutralizes the pain and unhappy emotion and leaves you with a clear conscience”. Similarly, a
1 This is not the only issue where economists and non –economists tend to disagree, see Sapienza and Zingales (2013).
2 From “The large Norwegian climate- and environmental survey 2010” conducted by Ipsos MMI  and CICERO Centre for
Climate Studies (“Den store norske klima- og miljøundersøkelsen 2010”).
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political comic strip by Ken Fisher satirized the Clean Air Act in 1992 by showing a homeowner (Ryder)
surprising a burglar in his home. Using a telephone exchange called “crime brokers” he sells his right
to kill the intruder to the brokers, who sell it on to a criminal (Sluggo). “Thus, Ryder over complied
with the law so that Sluggo could under comply. The same number of death results, but with a more
efﬁcient allocation”.
To economists, such arguments by analogy will seem like evidence of a basic misunderstanding.
Common to many of the examples we have come across, however, is the belief that markets for an
activity legitimize the activity and undermine moral norms. In this light, the ethical argument has two
parts: one supporting the claim that an activity X is unethical, and one supporting the claim that a
market in activity X would erode ethical norms against the activity.
A systematic and explicit statement of this argument comes from Harvard philosopher Michael
Sandel, who ﬁrst presented the argument in a 1997 New York Times op-ed (Sandel, 2005), restating it
in his recent book (Sandel, 2012). He argues that excessive CO2 emissions are morally objectionable,
and that this morally objectionable activity is legitimized by instituting a trading scheme. This makes
the trading scheme itself immoral.
There is some evidence that market-like features can inﬂuence the use and effect of informal pun-
ishments such as social sanction. In a widely cited study, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) found that a
ﬁne for picking up children late in a kindergarten resulted in more parents picking up their children
late. They argued that “a ﬁne is a price,” and that the introduction of a ﬁne shifted the way parents
saw their behavior: keeping your child in kindergarten after closing hours went from being an ethical
issue to being a service provided at a price. The introduction of the ﬁne led to a “crowding out” of the
ethical incentives. While the study does not support Sandel’s claim that prices undermine morality
more than ﬁnes do, stated behavior studied in Brekke et al. (2003) indicates that people do respond
differently to ﬁnes, which are seen as symbolically supporting an obligation, than they do to prices,
which are seen as fair compensation for a service available for purchase. It seems well established that
prices can undermine a moral obligation (see Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) for a recent survey of
the literature).
Viewed in this light, the strong reaction from economists that Sandel describes in the introductory
quote to this article may  seem surprising: textbook treatments of pollution in economics see pollution
as excessive if it generates more harm than beneﬁts. This deﬁnition of excessive seems different from
Sandel’s in strictness more than in kind. Crowding out, while not yet standard textbook material, is
the subject of a large literature, and would be unlikely to make economists ﬂood the New York Times
with letters. So where is the disagreement? As we  see it, the disagreement is likely about consequence
ethics versus virtue ethics.
When ﬁrm A sells a permit to ﬁrm B, A will pollute less and B more, but total pollution will remain
the same. Since both ﬁrms want to trade, they must both be better off. We  thus have the same pol-
lution, lower costs for both ﬁrms and no direct negative consequences. Evaluated on these outcomes
trade seems unobjectionable. Sandel, on the other hand, is inspired by virtue ethics. Polluting, and
hence harming others, is not consistent with a moral character. An institution that serves to legitimize
pollution is therefore itself objectionable, even if pollution levels remain the same.3
Our question is not whether Sandel is right in his moral objection to quota trade, but whether a simi-
lar moral objection could help explain the widespread opposition to tradable emission quota schemes:
are experimental participants opposed to trade in the right to do something morally wrong when
the trade is Pareto-improving in monetary outcomes? While surveys reveal substantial moral objec-
tion toward trading of pollution rights, attitudes may  be different when the participants themselves
experience the direct monetary beneﬁts of trade.
As we see it, the main moral objection against CO2 emissions is that marginal emissions at current
levels harm others in excess of what can be justiﬁed by individual gains. In our experiment, this effect
was reproduced by asking lab participants to choose how many ‘stickers’ to use. Each sticker used
increased their own payoff, but inﬂicted a monetary loss on their co-players, with the loss exceeding
3 For a challenge to the view that markets in carbon dioxide emission are objectionable from a virtue ethical perspective, see
Bruni and Sugden (2013).
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their private beneﬁt4. The private payoff from sticker-use was asymmetric within the group so as to
generate gains from trade in stickers.
In the baseline rounds participants used most of their stickers, just as people in practice generate
large CO2-emissions outside the lab. Next, we introduced limited use-rights for the stickers along with
an opportunity to trade user-rights within the group. “Burning” or retiring use-rights was  explicitly
ruled out to ensure that total harms were kept constant. For the treatment groups, this was  framed as
a tradable right to use stickers. In the control treatment, this was framed as a new and separate trading
scheme involving a new good that did not impose harms on anyone (details given below). Formally,
the two games were equivalent, so any differences should be due to the framing: trading the right
to harm others versus trading a morally neutral good. Before the trading scheme was introduced,
participants in both treatment and control groups were asked whether they thought that trading
should be allowed or not. After participating in 10 trading rounds, participants were given an actual
vote to decide whether trading should be allowed in a ﬁnal round.
Opposition to trade could be displayed in three ways: (1) by stating opposition to trade in a survey
question before experiencing trade, (2) by limiting the amount of trade (and thereby foregoing earn-
ings), and (3) by voting against trade in a ﬁnal round where the majority vote determined whether
or not trading would be allowed in the ﬁnal part of the experiment. If participants did see a moral
objection to trading the right to use stickers that harm others, we would expect them to vote against
trade both in the pre-experience hypothetical vote and in the post-experience real vote. We  would
expect no objections to trade in the control groups with trade in a morally neutral good. We  would
also expect that moral objections would show up as reluctance to trade in the treatment groups, so
that fewer rights would be traded in the treatment groups compared to the control groups.
The results showed no objections to trade in any of these outcome measures for either the treat-
ment or control groups. Various explanations of the results are possible: participants may  have found
the harm inﬂicted on others insufﬁciently severe to see sticker use as morally objectionable. Alter-
natively, they might not see trade in stickers as legitimizing stickers use. To test these hypotheses
we ran a survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk. These respondents had not participated in the original
experiment, but were given the instructions from the experiment and asked to assess whether sticker
use was morally objectionable, and whether a market in stickers would serve to legitimize such use.
Respondents tended to agree on both points: sticker use was  a moral issue, and the market legitimized
sticker use.
Another possibility could be that our research participants viewed markets more favorably than
most. This seems implausible in light of a post experimental survey on moral judgments of different
markets: our subjects stated strong moral objections to emission quota trade, rating the immorality of
quota trade between two ﬁrms almost as high as that of markets in human organs and sexual services.
In sum, the results from the experiment and the survey suggest that the sticker design fulﬁlled
both premises of Sandel’s argument, but without these features triggering strong opposition to trade
in stickers. This is consistent with the economists’ hypothesis that opposition to tradable emission
quotas is due to a misunderstanding of quota trading systems. Alternative explanations, however,
cannot be ruled out and the results should be seen as tentative: ﬁrst, the “Turkers” who  evaluated
the morality of sticker use and markets without directly participating in the experiment were also
asked control questions to test their understanding of the experimental design. Almost none were
able to answer all questions correctly, and remaining misunderstandings may  have inﬂuenced their
moral judgments. Second, to the extent that the ethical norms are speciﬁc to the activity involved,
the case for strengthening and protecting norms against “sticker use” is likely to be weaker than the
case for strengthening and protecting norms against excessive CO2 emissions. That is, our subject may
share the view that CO2 emission is an act that should be penalized, but at the same time ﬁnd sticker
use within the experiment too trivial to warrant stigmatizing. If this was the case, Sandel’s argument
against markets that legitimize immoral acts would not apply in the speciﬁc case studied. Third,
4 For most types of emissions, the private beneﬁts exceed the social cost for low levels of emissions. By standard economic
arguments, emissions are socially harmful and policy interventions required only when social costs exceed private beneﬁts.
We  have thus chosen to calibrate the experiment such that this is the case for all stickers used.
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the experimental instructions emphasized that subjects understood the payoff consequences of their
action. This may  speciﬁcally trigger consequentialist moral judgment. Paxton et al. (2011) documents
that working on mathematical problems increases the probability of later moral judgments being
consequentialist. One third of our participants are students of math, although recruited in their ﬁrst
year at university, this selection of students may  be particularly prone to consequentialist behavior.
In conclusion, while our experiment fails to show how moral opposition to quota trade arises, it does
show that such resistance is not an automatic response triggered in any market that involves trade in
immoral goods.
2. Other moral objections to quota trade
To avoid misunderstanding, it is worth noting that our experiment is not intended to test whether
participants have moral objections to quota-markets in general. Our aim is to test how important and
widely held a very speciﬁc type of objection is. To make this point clearer it may  be useful to point out
some examples of alternative objections that are not tested in this study. In addition to features which
are speciﬁc to quota trade as a policy instrument, there are also other ethical questions raised by such
trading schemes. These concerns may  involve the amount, distribution and timing of abatements, as
well as the distribution of costs (see further discussion of such general ethical issues in the context of
climate change in Gardiner, 2004).
While trade in emission quotas is Pareto-improving, the gains may  be asymmetrically shared. If
sellers of quotas are poor and the gains primarily go to rich buyers, an objection to the trade may  be
that it increases inequality. If the prices are sufﬁciently favorable to the party that is best off, theories
of inequality aversion like Fehr and Schmidt (1999) would predict that participant in the lab would
oppose trade. Ciccone et al. (2015) test such a trading scheme in the lab and ﬁnd that participants
are indeed reluctant to trade at set prices that strongly favor the rich, even if the trade is Pareto-
improving in monetary outcomes. This could explain objections to emissions trading if participants
think the market price will favor rich countries. It is unlikely to be relevant in our experiment, where
prices are endogenous and would shift in response.
Other objections to emissions trading are more pragmatic and related to speciﬁc design details. One
such sub-optimal feature is the often excessive amount of quotas issued, both in the Kyoto Protocol
and within the EU ETS trading system. This makes the abatement generated by the quota system
limited and insufﬁcient, and may  be a reason for opposing speciﬁc implementations of such policies.
Another frequently criticized feature of the Kyoto Protocol is its Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
The CDM raises several problematic incentive effects and may in fact increase emissions rather than
stabilizing them as intended (Strand and Rosendahl, 2012). Such criticism, which was also included
in Sandel’s 1997 op-ed, is common also amongst economists, but apply to ﬂawed implementations of
the policy rather than to the “intrinsic” morality of quota trade per se.
3. Experimental design
The experiment consisted of three stages which are outlined in Table 1. Stage 1 was  a linear common
pool resource game where taking from the common pool resource was framed as “using stickers.”
By using a sticker the participant earned a private payoff, but at the same time imposed negative
externalities on the three other group members. The private earnings of sticker use was  asymmetric,
in order to create gains from trade in stage 2. Stage 1 of the experiment was  played for 10 rounds and
was identical for both control and treatment sessions.
In stage 2, the groups in the treatment sessions were issued a limited number of rights to use
stickers. These rights were tradable and could not be retired (i.e., the “quotas” could not be “burnt”).
This design was  chosen to ensure that total harms could not be inﬂuenced by participants. If it had
been possible to retire stickers, however, “strongly moral” participants would face new moral issues
regarding trade: selling a sticker you would not otherwise use would run the risk that the buyer would
use the sticker, increasing total harm. This would make sales morally problematic. Alternatively, the
“strongly moral” participant might want to purchase additional stickers in order to retire these and
reduce total harms further. While such motives are an interesting issue in themselves, these effects
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Table 1
Overview of the stages in the experiment.
Description Treatment sessions Control sessions
Stage 1 Common pool resource game
Identical for both treatments
(10 rounds)
Withdrawals from the common pool by using “stickers”, which
are individually proﬁtable (asymmetrically within the group)
but harm other group members




Cap-and trade with harmful
stickers: limited amount of
user rights to the harmful
stickers are introduced, which
are open for trade within the
group
Cap and trade with new,
non-harmful stickers. Payoffs
transformed to equal the
payoffs per trade in the
treatment groups with harmful
stickers
Stage 3 Voting: should trade be
allowed in the ﬁnal round?
Final round with endogenous
rules
Cap on user rights equal to
stage 2. Vote on trade with
user rights for harmful stickers
Cap on non-harmful stickers
equal to stage 2. Vote on trade
with the non-harmful stickers.
Post-experiment survey
are not part of the discussion we wanted to focus on in this experiment as it is not central to virtue
ethical argument.
A second beneﬁt of the “no burning of stickers” rule was that it enabled us to create a formally
equivalent control treatment without an externality frame: by manipulating the baseline endow-
ment and payoffs, the exact same payoff structure could be framed as trade in a “new good” with no
externalities.
Before stage 2 was implemented, participants were asked a hypothetical question of whether they
thought trade should be allowed or not.
In stage 3, having directly experienced trading, participants voted on whether or not to allow
trading of sticker user rights in a ﬁnal round, and the majority vote was implemented. The different
stages are outlined in detail below.
3.1. Stage 1 – establishing the morally suspect good
To avoid having prior attitudes toward environmental or other goods inﬂuence results, a non-
environmental setting with a public bad, labeled stickers, was  established. In groups of four, each
group member initially received 10 stickers. Their task was  to determine how many stickers, Ri, to
use. For each sticker used, the participant would get a private payoff, ai, while reducing the payoff of
each remaining group member by 10 kroner.5 Participants were randomly assigned one of the two
types, differing only in their private payoff from sticker use. The low productivity type, denoted as
type 1 in the experiment, earned 5 kroner per sticker used. The high productivity type, denoted type
2, earned 25 kroner per sticker used. In addition to the stickers, each participant was  given a baseline
endowment of 150 kroner in the beginning of each round. Payoff of participant i in one round was
determined as:
i = 150 + aiRi − 10
∑
j /=  i
Rj with ai = 5 or 25
Note that participants of both types could earn negative payoffs in stage 1. This would occur if a
participant used few stickers while the remaining group members used a lot. The low productivity type
would also get negative payoff if everyone, including the low productivity type, used all their stickers.
The instructions emphasized that while payoffs in stage 1 were potentially negative, the payoffs in
later stages would be sufﬁciently positive that total earnings from participating in the experiment
would nonetheless be positive.
5 The exchange rate on the day of the experiment was 1 US dollar = 5.54 Norwegian kroner.
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Participants played 10 rounds of the stage 1 game, and this stage was  identical for both treatment
and control sessions. They were explained that their realized payoff from stage 1 of the experiment
would be the payoff from one of the ten rounds, determined by a random draw.
After each round, participants were given information on their earnings (endowment + payoff from
own sticker use), how much they would lose from the harm imposed on them by other group members,
and how much they would receive net, should that particular round be drawn. This information was
provided in order to increase the probability of a move to a non-cooperative solution of the public
good game, and to further establish the sticker as a morally suspect good.
3.2. Stage 2 (treatment) – establishing a market for harmful stickers
After stage 1 was completed, the treatment groups were told that the right to use stickers would
now be constrained to avoid excessive harms. Each participant would be given an endowment of
150 kroner and two “rights” to use stickers per round. These use rights could be traded within the
group. Retiring use rights was not possible: each participant would automatically use their stickers.
Total harm from externalities was thus ﬁxed, and
∑
i
Ri = 8 for all groups.
In the stage 2 game, the participant’s decision problem was  to decide on the number of user rights
to buy or sell. Whatever stickers they possessed at the end of the trading round were automatically
used.
The double auction market was implemented in a way that ensured that all realized trades would
be Pareto-improving in monetary payoffs. Since the total number of stickers used in a four person
group would always be 8,
∑
j /= i
Rj = 8 − Ri, we  can rewrite the payoff of participant i:
i = 150 − 80 + (ai + 10)Ri − (Ri − 2)pR = 70 + (ai + 10 − pR)Ri + 2pR,
where pR is the trading price for the right to use stickers. A participant with ai = 5 will thus gain from
selling rights at prices of 15 kroner and above, while those with ai = 25 will gain from buying at prices
of 35 kroner and below. To ensure that no participant saw their payoffs reduced after trading, market
prices were constrained to lie in the interval from 15 to 35 kroner. The market was  open for one and
a half minutes in each round.
In the main treatment, the instructions were designed to highlight the harm imposed on others by
sticker use: using a printed table and a detailed run-through of a single example, participants were
shown how sticker sales would affect payoffs through multiple channels. For instance: if a seller sold
a right for 15 kroner, the seller would (i) receive the agreed price of 15 kroner, but also (ii) lose the
revenue from using the sticker him/herself (5 kroner), and iii) lose 10 kroner due to the increased harm
the extra sticker-right would allow the buyer to impose on the seller.
Before trade started, participants were asked a hypothetical question: “Do you think it should be
possible to trade the user rights?”
As in stage 1, stage 2 lasted for 10 rounds – one of which was randomly chosen to determine actual
payoffs. After each round, participants were informed about the payoffs that would result from this
stage of the experiment if the prior round was  drawn. The information was presented in a manner
highlighting the shifting of harms, including: the participant’s gross income (endowment and earnings
from any stickers one held at the end of the round), the gross loss (loss due to sticker use by other
group members), and net earnings.
3.3. Stage 2 (control) – establishing a market for non-harmful stickers
After completing stage 1 participants in the control treatment were told that the next stage of
the experiment would introduce a new type of stickers that imposed no harm on others. In actuality,
the game was the same as that played by participants in the main treatment, but with endowments
and productivities altered to “hide” the similarity. By making the externality effects invisible and
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presenting new private productivities, the new stickers appeared substantively different from the
harmful stickers encountered in stage 1.
The low productivity type now earned 15 kroner per new sticker used and the high productivity
type earned 35 kroner per sticker used. Each participant received 2 such “new” stickers in the beginning
of each round, and could trade these within their four-person group. The trade was  conducted in the
same double auction market as the treatment groups, with prices limited to the interval between 15
and 35 kroner, in order to ensure that trade was Pareto improving.
In this way, we ensured that the game played was formally equivalent to that played by participants
in the main treatment. This implied an endowment per participant of 70 kroner. The resulting payoff
for participant i was then:
i = 70 + (ai + 10)Ri − (Ri − 2)pR = 70 + (ai + 10 − pR)Ri + 2pR
Before trade started, participants were asked a hypothetical question: “Do you think it should be
possible to trade the stickers?”
As in stage 1, stage 2 lasted for 10 rounds – one of which was  randomly chosen to determine actual
payoffs. After each round, participants were informed about the payoffs that would result from this
stage of the experiment if that particular round was  drawn. They received information about their
net income (endowment and earnings from any stickers used and income/expenditure from traded
stickers), with no reference to externalities or harms.
3.4. Stage 3 – revealing attitudes toward market
In stage 3 of the experiment, participants in both treatments were told that they would play one
more round of the game they had played in stage 2, but that the presence of a market would be
decided by a majority vote. The question was otherwise identical to that used in the “hypothetical”
vote conducted prior to stage 2.
After casting their vote, the last round was run in accordance with the majority decision of the
session. Stage 3 consisted of only one round, with the choices made in that round determining the
payoffs. After the round, participants were given information on their stage 3 payoffs. They were also
told which of the stage 1 and stage 2 rounds that would determine their realized payoffs from those
stages, in addition to the total payoff earned from the experiment as a whole. This information was
followed by a short post-experiment survey.
4. Results
Participants were recruited from large undergraduate classes in mathematics6 and assigned to two
experimental sessions held back-to-back on Friday, September 9th, 2011. There were 24 participants
in the treatment session (6 groups) and 20 participants in the control session (5 groups). At the request
of one of the referees, an additional four sessions were held back-to-back on Tuesday, March 25th,
2014 in order to increase statistical power (see Section 5). These participants were recruited from
classes in the philosophy of science, mandatory to all students at the University of Oslo. There were 40
participants in the new treatment sessions (10 groups) and 40 participants in the new control sessions
(10 groups). In total: 64 participants (16 groups) in treatment sessions and 60 participants (15 groups)
in control sessions.
4.1. Stage I: extensive sticker use in the common pool resource game
On average over the 10 rounds, 70% of all stickers were used, with some group heterogeneity.
Calculating, for each group separately, the average share of stickers used over the 10 rounds, the
share used varied between groups from a minimum of 26.3% to maximum of 95.5%. There were no
systematic differences in group sticker use by control and treatment sessions (see Fig. 1). Using a
6 These are students who plan to proceed with math, computer science or natural sciences.
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Fig. 1. Stickers use by period and treatment in Stage 1.
t-test at the group level: calculating the mean sticker use in the ﬁrst ﬁve and last ﬁve periods for each
group separately, we found no signiﬁcant differences between treatment and control groups in either
set of periods. In the ﬁrst ﬁve periods, treatment-groups used an average of 66.7% of their stickers
against 64.6% in the control groups (p-value = 0.7). In the last ﬁve periods, the numbers were 70.7%
for treatment and 77.4% for control groups (p-value = 0.27).
In the 10 rounds of stage 1, average sticker use increased from 58% in the ﬁrst round to 80% in the
last. A regression of group-level sticker-use on the round-number (with group ﬁxed effects) gives a
statistically signiﬁcant positive trend of 1.8 percentage points per round (p < 0.01).
On average across the 10 rounds, low productivity players used 1.2 fewer stickers than high pro-
ductivity players (p = 0.01). Recall that while all participants imposed a loss of 30 kroner on the other
members of the group for each sticker they used, the private payoffs for imposing this harm was only
5 kroner per sticker for low earners as compared to 25 kroner for high earners. If all the members in
a group used 7 stickers each, the high productivity members would earn 105 kroner while the low
productivity members would lose 35 kroner. If no one in the group used stickers, each member’s net
payoff would equal the endowment of 140 kroner and this would clearly be a Pareto improvement.
4.2. Stage 2: no difference in market attitudes between the treatment and the control
A cap on sticker use equal to two stickers per person gives a payoff of 90 and 130 (to low and high
productivity type respectively), and is thus a Pareto improvement relative to the “laissez faire” sticker
use in stage 1 of the experiment. The results from stage 2 are shown in Table 2.
Participants were ﬁrst asked to vote hypothetically for or against trade, given the cap on sticker-
use per player. In the treatment sessions 80% of the participants supported trade in the hypothetical
vote, while 83% of the control sessions participants did the same. The difference was  not signiﬁcant
(p = 0.61). However, when we look at the separate types in the treatment sessions only, we see that the
low productivity types are signiﬁcantly more negative to trade than the high productivity types in this
pre-experience hypothetical vote (69% of low productivity types versus 91% of high productivity types
oppose trade in the treatment session, p = 0.03). This difference is not found in the control sessions. Low
productivity types in the treatment sessions are also more reluctant to trade in this pre-experience
vote than low productivity types in the control sessions (a weakly signiﬁcant difference, p = 0.09).
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Table 2
Market attitudes in stage 2 and stage 3 of the experiment.
Treatment Control t-test
Pre-experience hypothetical vote 80% (n = 64) 83% (n = 60) p = 0.61
%  in favor of trade (n)
Low productivity types 69% (n = 32) 87% (n = 30) p = 0.09
High  productivity types 91% (n = 32) 80% (n = 30) p = 0.24
Realized trade 93% (n = 16) 88% (n = 15) p = 0.13
In  % of possible trades
Average price 27.8 kroner (n = 16) 26.9 kroner (n = 15) p = 0.42
Price  (n)
Post-experience real vote 64% (n = 64) 77% (n = 60) p = 0.13
%  in favor of trade (n)
Low productivity types 72% (n = 32) 87% (n = 30) p = 0.16
High  productivity types 56% (n = 32) 67% (n = 30) p = 0.41
In the treatment sessions, 93% of all user rights were traded, with an average price of 27.8 kroner
per right. As a price of 25 kroner would give equal gains to both players, an average of 27.8 kroner
is somewhat skewed in favor of the low productivity types (sellers) who  were also worse off before
trade. In the control sessions, 88% of all stickers were traded, with an average price of 26.9 kroner.
There was no signiﬁcant difference in the amount of realized trades or the average prices between the
treatment and control.
4.3. Stage 3: no difference in voting behavior between the treatment and the control
Finally, when actually voting over trade, the support for trade was still substantial. 64% voted
in favor of trade in the treatment sessions, while 77% voted for trade in the control session. While
we expected the control group to have fewer moral objections to trade, the overall difference was
not signiﬁcant (p = 0.13). Comparing the post-experience vote with the pre-experience hypothetical
vote, the support for trade is relatively constant among the low productivity types but has fallen
considerably among the high productivity types. In the treatment sessions, the support for trade among
high productivity types fell from 91% to 56%, a signiﬁcant reduction (p = 0.0015). The support for trade
among high productivity types fell in the control sessions as well, however not signiﬁcantly.
A possible reason why the support for trade fell is that it took time in the lab. As each market was
open for 90 s, 10 trading rounds took at least 15 min. Subjects eager to leave the lab may  thus have
voted against more trading. Actually, the last stage had only one trading round, but this may  not have
been sufﬁciently clear from the instructions.
4.4. Potential reasons for no market opposition
The results fail to support the hypothesis that participants resist trade because this would legitimize
an objectionable action. This does not in any way undermine Sandel’s moral argument, but it does show
that an objection along the lines of his argument is not triggered in this speciﬁc experimental setting.
There are several possible reasons for this, some of which can be ruled out.
4.5. Have we recruited pro-trade participants?
One possible reason why our participants are so positive to trade could be that we  recruited a par-
ticularly pro-trade sample. While we took care not to recruit among economics students to avoid the
doctrinal thinking Sandel claims characterizes economists, one third of our sample was recruited from
mathematics students, who may  also hold particularly favorable view of markets. A post-experimental
survey elicited participants’ attitudes toward a number of morally questionable real world markets.
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Fig. 2. Post-experiment attitudes toward markets, both sessions (n = 124).
The sample exhibits attitudes toward markets that are, to economists, rather astonishing in their
anti-trade sentiments.
The attitudes toward speciﬁc markets were elicited by this question:
For each of the following areas, to what extent do you think that it is morally acceptable to trade
in these goods/services for money? 1-Very immoral, 2-In principle immoral, but acceptable in
some cases, 3-Morally acceptable, 4-Don’t know.
The goods/services were: (a) Body parts, (b) Sexual services, (c) Emissions rights for ﬁrms, (d)
Emissions rights for nations, (e) Goods produced in poor countries by workers on a very low salary, (f)
Food from countries where a large share of the population is suffering from hunger and malnutrition.
The results for all sessions combined are shown in Fig. 2. All the markets are judged to be immoral
by a vast majority of participants, and Mann Whitney tests revealed no signiﬁcant differences between
the treatment and control sessions in their post-experiment attitudes to such markets. Fig. 3 shows
the response distributions for control and treatment sessions separately.
4.6. Statistical power
Our experiment is an attempt to examine whether the virtue ethical reasoning discussed above
can explain the widespread opposition to quota-trade. We  argue that this is not the case, as we ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant difference between the different treatments. We  initially reached this conclusion after
running the experiment on 44 participants in September 2011. A referee suggested that this sample
might be too small to identify an effect, and recommended a power analysis and further sessions to
increase the number of participants.
Our research question was whether Sandel’s moral argument could explain a substantial share
of the opposition to quota trade. As noted above, a nationally representative sample found 46%
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Fig. 3. Post-experiment attitudes toward markets, by treatment.
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of the population opposing tradable emission quotas. Opposition amongst our participants seems
even higher: trading of emission rights between nations was  judged as “highly immoral” in the
post-experiment survey by 36%, with an additional 37% seeing it as immoral in principle–but
acceptable in some cases. Thus the opposition in our subject pool in the range 36–73%. Counting
at least a fraction of those who answered “immoral in principle” as opposing emission rights trade,
the opposition seems to be at least as high as the 46% in the national sample. If virtue ethics is an
important explanation of this opposition, we  would think that it should account for at least 15–20
percentage points of the trade opposition. We  would thus want a sample size in which we would
with high probability detect a 20% treatment effect, and with considerable probability also detect a
10% treatment effect. An effect of less than 10% would be of limited interest.
Under the null hypothesis, opposition to trade is the same in both treatment and control groups.
Based on the 2011 sessions with 44 participants this gives us an 11% baseline opposition (10% vote
against trade in the control session and 12.5% vote against trade in the treatment session). As discussed
above subjects may  have objected to trade to save time in the lab, or it may  reﬂect all kinds of opposition
to trade. Even if we assume that this opposition revealed by voting in our sample is not related to
Sandel’s argument and subtract this opposition from the 46% opposition we  want to explain, this
leaves us with 35 percentage points of the sample opposing trade for reasons that may  be related to
Sandel’s argument. The 20% and 10% benchmarks remain reasonable in light of this.
What is the probability that we would reject the null hypothesis at conventional signiﬁcance levels
if the true average effect of the treatment is a 10 or 20 percentage point increase in trade opposition?
Since the mean of a binomial distribution is approximately normal, the probability that the means






p is the opposition to trade in the treatment group and q the opposition in the control group. The
standard deviation  is a function of the number of observations and the probabilities. (We  ignore
the probability of falsely ﬁnding signiﬁcantly more opposition in the control group.) Following the
tradition of using the stricter two sided test even with a one sided hypothesis, the relevant threshold
for a 10% signiﬁcance test is t * =1.645..
To reach a power of7 80% if the true effect is 20% we would need 28 more observations in both
control and treatment. We  ran two new sessions adding 40 subjects in both control and treatment.
The power is 88% when using the initial base rate, but the general opposition to trade was  higher in the
last sessions,8 reducing the power to 84%, but still above the standard 80% threshold. With a smaller
true effect of 10% we would get a signiﬁcant effect with 45% probability. It would take a sample size
of more than 200 in each group to reach a power of 80% in this case. We  can thus be rather conﬁdent
that if there was a strong effect we would ﬁnd it, while with a small true effect (10%) we  may  have
failed to ﬁnd it just by bad luck.
4.7. External assessment of morality of experimental choices
Sandel’s argument has two premises: an activity X is immoral, and trade legitimizes the use of the
traded goods or services. One reason for our lacking results could be that sticker use in the ﬁrst part
of the experiment was not seen as immoral.
To test this possibility, we conducted a survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk. This is an online “labor
market” where individuals from around the world do short, simple, web-based tasks for real money.
The “Turkers” were presented with an English translation of the experimental instructions, somewhat
simpliﬁed as the mechanics and implementation of the double auction trade were irrelevant for the
question. They next had to answer comprehension tests (with monetary incentives for correct under-
standing). Finally, they were asked to evaluate the morality of sticker use in the ﬁrst part, and for the
second part of the experiment, to evaluate the morality both of establishing a market, and of trading
in the market. 56 persons answered the survey which was  conducted on June 1st 2012.
7 The 80% threshold is considered standard in the literature. See e.g. Bellemare et al. (2014) who also ﬁnd that the required
sample size greatly exceeds sizes used in the experimental economics literature.
8 That is based on the initial results we  use p = 0.31 and q = 0.11, while the updated opposition would imply p = 0.38 and
q  = 0.18 with a 20% effect.
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Table 3
Survey attitudes toward sticker use in the experiment from Mechanical Turk.
Moral Neutral Immoral
Sticker use by the low earning type 29% 29% 43%
Sticker use by the high earning type 41% 30% 29%
Allow a market for sticker use 35% 21% 43%
Buy sticker-use rights 36% 37% 27%
Sell sticker-use rights 32% 30% 38%
Disagree Neutral Agree
Market will make sticker use seem more moral 20% 30% 50%
The respondents claimed to see the experimental choices as morally relevant. More participants
responded that stickers use was immoral than those who  responded that it was  moral. The results
are presented in Table 3. Note that the categories “strongly moral” and “somewhat moral” have been
merged, and similarly the categories “strongly immoral” and “somewhat immoral”.
A considerable share of the Turkers thus considered sticker-use to be immoral, and saw markets in
user rights as undermining this. Turkers also answered the same questions regarding the morality of
the particular markets from the post-experimental survey. In these questions, the Turkers expressed
less anti-trade attitudes than the experimental participants. This supports the previous conclusion
that our experimental sample was not generally more pro-trade than others.
Still, we have several caveats about the responses from Mechanical Turk. First, with no incentives
to answer truthfully, random responses cannot be ruled out. The answers are indeed rather evenly
distributed with a stronger emphasis on the middle alternatives, a similar pattern to what random
responses would produce. Note, however, that the different assessments of stickers use by high and
low earners make good sense. There is a stronger tendency to agree to the claim that markets can
legitimize an action, which is also consistent with the ﬁndings on crowding out in the economics
literature.
Moreover, the majority of respondents were unable to answer all comprehension questions cor-
rectly. Probably this is partly due to complicated instructions, lack of practical experience with the
experiment (as opposed to the participants in the experiment) and insufﬁcient time used by Turkers
to read instructions. Although Turkers were given a bonus if all comprehension tests were correctly
answered, they did not have the same incentives to thoroughly understand the instructions as partic-
ipants in the experiment. Participating Turkers on average spent nearly 17 min  on the survey, which
should be enough time to read the 2 pages of instructions thoroughly, answer 7 comprehension
tests and answer 6 ethical judgments. Since this is only the average, a large share may have used
considerably less time and hence misunderstood.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Our experiment does not support the hypothesis that people oppose trade in immoral goods
because markets legitimize actions that deserve to be stigmatized. This does not imply that such a
moral argument is invalid, only that our experimental participants did not apply this logic in this spe-
ciﬁc context. The results show that moral opposition is not necessarily generated in markets trading
immoral goods. However, as with any non-result the lack of result could be due to poor experimental
design. While we have tried to test for some of the possible problems that could arise, we  may  have
overlooked others.
One reviewer point out that “people often view (perhaps incorrectly) pollution as being done by
“others” (ﬁrms) and victims as “us” whereas in [our] experiment everyone is both victim and polluter.”
In the lab this could correspond to having the externality hit some passive participants possibly in
another room. While an economist’s response to this claim would be that the externality is unaffected
by the trade, we cannot rule out that it would have an impact on how subjects assess the moral standing
of trade in the given setting. Ciccone et al. (2015) do ﬁnd that distributional impact of trade matters,
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and our subjects are negative to buying inexpensive goods produced by low-paid workers. Still, as
Turkers found the stickers use wrong in our case too, we doubt that this is the essential element of
the moral evaluation.
A  different counterargument would be that check-mating your opponent in a game of chess is
moral, even though it imposes a loss on your opponent. The experiment may  similarly be viewed by
participants as a game to be “won.” With such a mindset, sticker use may  not be seen as morally wrong.
This, however, should then apply to many experiments on moral behavior. In our case, it would imply
that participants will act as if they do not have any moral objections to a market in the right to do
wrong, while outside the experimental context they do. The assessment of the Turkers, however, is
more consistent with sticker use being morally wrong, even within the context of the experiment.
Another possibility, related to the different mindset triggered in the ﬁeld and in the experiment,
is that experiments in economics “train” participants to focus on consequences. By highlight-
ing and focusing on consequences, the set-up and instructions may  prime for a consequentialist
ethic. The argument that trade legitimizes morally objectionable behavior seems to build on non-
consequentialist ethics: the intention (to be moral) is important in itself, independently of the behavior
it generates. If so, precise instructions and training rounds to teach payoff consequences may  tem-
porarily erase or weaken the reasoning that ordinarily drives judgments of markets.
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